Incentives for Change: China\u27s Cadre System Applied to Water Quality by Golding, Wyatt F.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 20 Number 2 
3-1-2011 
Incentives for Change: China's Cadre System Applied to Water 
Quality 
Wyatt F. Golding 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Wyatt F. Golding, Comment, Incentives for Change: China's Cadre System Applied to Water Quality, 20 
Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 399 (2011). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol20/iss2/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Compilation © 2011 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association 
 
INCENTIVES FOR CHANGE: CHINA’S CADRE SYSTEM 
APPLIED TO WATER QUALITY 
Wyatt F. Golding† 
Abstract: The Chinese government has struggled to enforce environmental law, 
due in part to local protectionism.  In an attempt to overcome local protectionism, the 
2008 Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution uses the cadre system to 
incentivize local officials to enforce national water quality standards.  This comment 
argues that the cadre system presents a pragmatic means of attaining enforcement of 
quantified environmental standards because it implements the already existing Chinese 
Communist Party’s system of vertical hierarchy that has proven relatively successful in 
achieving other social goals.  The cadre system, however, will only produce clean water 
over the long-term if it incentivizes political support and funding for environmental 
protection agencies to create accurate quantified water quality data.  Moreoever, China’s 
use of the cadre system in combating water pollution signals a move toward a political 
rather than legal solution and will further centralize Chinese Communist Party power, 
thus limiting transparency, democracy, and public involvement.   
I. INTRODUCTION  
Until recently, it appeared that China would employ the judiciary to 
solve a deepening environmental crisis.1  However, the Chinese government, 
under the leadership of the Central Communist Party (“CCP”), is moving 
away from rule of law towards a tighter embrace of political solutions.2  To 
increase the accountability of political officials, the CCP employs an 
incentive structure, known as the cadre system, that functions as a market 
solution within a political context.  This paper analyzes the history and 
context of the cadre system as employed in the 2008 amended version of the 
Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution and argues that while 
the system as currently employed disenfranchises the Chinese people, it 
pragmatically applies the strongest governing force currently possible in 
China and has strong potential for achieving cleaner water.  This paper also 
argues that the Communist Party should implement more public involvement 
in the cadre system, in order to broaden enforcement, involve citizens, and 
strengthen political support.   
                                           
†
 J.D. Candidate at the University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2011.  Many thanks to 
Professor Bill Rodgers, Professor Dongsheng Zang, Professor Carl Minzner, Amanda Maus, Albert 
Buchman, and Sarah Jordan for their support, insight, and editing.   
1
 See Patti Goldman, Public Interest Environmental Law in China: Lessons Learned from the U.S. 
Experience, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 253 (2007).   
2
 See generally Randall Peerenboom, More Law, Less Courts: Legalized Governance 
Judicialization and Dejudicialization in China, (La Trobe U. Sch. of L., Paper No. 2008/10), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1265147.   
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 Environmental laws and legal enforcement have failed to 
meaningfully prevent water pollution in China.  The National People’s 
Congress of the People’s Republic of China (“China”) promulgated the Law 
on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (“LPCWP”) in 1984,3 yet 
poor water quality continues to wreak significant economic, health, and 
ecological damage.  In 1997, the World Bank calculated that damage from 
air and water pollution cost China fifty-four billion U.S. dollars annually, or 
eight percent of gross domestic product.4  Sixty percent of the surface water 
from sampling sites in the nation’s seven major rivers is unfit for fishing or 
swimming,5 while over ninety percent of the groundwater in wells in eastern 
provinces is unsuitable for drinking.6  A steep decline in aquatic biodiversity 
captured the world’s attention in 2006, when a six-week survey found that 
the Yangtze River dolphin, the “goddess of the Yangtze,” had gone extinct 
due to water pollution.7 
  The critical question in the face of these failures is why China’s 
regime of relatively developed8 environmental protection laws has been 
unsuccessful.  Scholars widely agree that the primary answer is a principal-
agent problem, dubbed local protectionism.9  There is a two-part cause to 
this widespread problem.10  First, legislation in China is generally 
aspirational and vague, and enforced within a legal system that lacks 
effective vertical hierarchy.11  This legal context gives great enforcement 
discretion to local officials.  Second, local officials exercise their 
                                           
3
 Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., May 11, 1984), available in English at 
http://english.mep.gov.cn/Policies_Regulations/laws/environmental_laws/200710/t20071009_109915.htm 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2010).   
4
 WORLD BANK, CLEAR WATER, BLUE SKIES 23 (World Bank 1997).  
5
 WORLD BANK, ADDRESSING CHINA’S WATER SCARCITY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELECTED 
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES 11 (World Bank 2009); see also The Asia Water Project: China, 
Water Crisis, http://www.asiawaterproject.org/water-crises/water-facts/surface-water-pollution.  
6
 Id.   
7
 Peter Ritter, Farewell to the Yangtze River Dolphin, TIME MAG., Aug. 10 2007, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1651819,00.html.  
8
 Richard J. Ferris, Jr., Reaching Out to the Rule of Law:  China’s Continuing Efforts to Develop an 
Effective Environmental Law Regime, 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 569, 581 (2003).  The author quotes 
a Chinese environmental protection official as saying “China has a wealth of laws with shallow roots.”  Id. 
at 588.  
9
 Id. (listing sources).  Local protectionism has long been a problem in environmental enforcement 
in the United States, and spurred the growth of federal legislation and a developed national regulatory 
system.  See PETER CLEARY YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE 
POLLUTION 64 (Cambridge 1991); see also Carl F. Minzner, Riots and Cover-ups: Counterproductive 
Control of Local Agents in China, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 53, 113 (2009).  
10
 Xin Qiu & Honglin Li, Super Ministry Reform, Background, Challenges, and the Future, 39 Env. 
L. Inst. 10152, 10160 (2009), available at www.epa.gov/ogc/china/xin.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).   
11
 Benjamin van Rooij, Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement and 
Political Campaigns, 37 DEVEL. & CHANGE 57, 60 (2006). 
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enforcement discretion to protect local economic interests rather than 
implementing national environmental legislative purposes.12 
 The Chinese government functions with two separate, but intertwined 
institutions:  the government and the CCP.  The CCP is a functionally 
unopposed political organization with selective membership that develops 
and places government officials.  The cadre system is a means of 
documenting and incentivizing attainment of goals by CCP officials.  
Higher-level officials attach personal, political, and monetary accountability 
to water quality attainment by tying attainment of goals to individual party 
members’ or cadres’ success within the CCP and to monetary rewards.  The 
cadre system also establishes joint and several liability for failures.  In this 
system, local officials must take whatever measures necessary to meet 
nationalized standards in order to retain and increase their political stature. 
In 2008, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee attempted to 
eliminate the negative effects of local protectionism on water quality by 
implementing the cadre system, outlined in Article Five of the LPCWP.13  
 Use of the cadre system is attractive because applying strict and joint 
liability within an existing vertical structure simplifies oversight and allows 
local flexibility in the method used to attain concrete goals.  However, 
because of the complexity of water quality attainment and economic 
tradeoffs, the cadre system alone will produce reactionary, short-term results. 
Sustainable water quality will be meaningfully attained only to the extent 
that 1) the cadre system incentivizes funding and the creation of political 
space for local and regional enforcement agencies, called Environmental 
Protection Bureaus (“EPBs”), and 2) the EPBs create accurate data to ensure 
accountability.   
  Part II provides background for the political history and context of 
the cadre system.  Part III provides an analysis of the likely effectiveness of 
implementation.  Part IV argues that long-term water quality attainment 
requires a developed environmental enforcement agency, and that the cadre 
system should officials to provide greater political space and funding for 
those agencies.  Part V comments on the opaque and centralized nature of 
                                           
12
  Id. at 61. 
13
  Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
May 11, 1984), available in English at 
http://english.mep.gov.cn/Policies_Regulations/laws/environmental_laws/200710/t20071009_109915.htm (last visited Dec. 
19, 2010).   The amendments also modified regulations, implemented the country’s first national permitting 
system, attached personal liability to actors in polluting entities, and strengthened the position of civil legal 
aid groups in citizen suit litigation.   See Dawn Winalski, Note, Cleaner Water in China?, 24 J. ENVTL. L. & 
LITIG., 181, 185 (2009). 
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the cadre system, and provides suggestions for methods of incorporating 
public input.  Part VI concludes.   
II. BACKGROUND: THE CADRE SYSTEM IS A PROVEN SOLUTION FOR A 
PRESSING NEW PROBLEM 
 Water pollution is a pressing problem in China.  In this Part, Section A 
describes China’s problems with water pollution and early legal efforts to 
combat it.  Section B describes the framework by which the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection attempts to enforce environmental laws.  Finally, 
Section C describes the history and implementation mechanisms of the cadre 
system. 
A. Legal Efforts to Combat Water Pollution Have Proven Insufficient 
 In 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China began 
privatization and what is now known as the Chinese economic miracle. 
Markets and foreign domestic investment mushroomed, causing GDP per 
capita to increase more than twenty-fold from $84 in 1984 to $2,034 in 
2007.14  As that growth was based largely on industry and factory 
production, environmental degradation occurred on an unprecedented scale 
over the same time period.  
 In coordination with this degradation, China instituted several 
environmental laws.  In 1978, the National People’s Congress added Article 
6, Section 1 to the Chinese constitution, providing that “the state protects 
and improves the living environment and the ecological environment, and 
prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards.”15  Rivers and 
other bodies of water are state property subject to state control.16  Also in 
1978, the National People’s Congress passed the Environmental Protection 
Law (for trial implementation), which required related departments in the 
central government, as well as all provincial and municipal governments, to 
establish environmental protection institutes.17  This framework resulted in 
serious issues surrounding conflict of laws, as each level of government 
created differing environmental quality standards. 
                                           
14
 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 430 (2008).  Figures are exchange rate based.  
15
 Qiu & Li, supra note 10, at 10153; see also XIANFA art. 11 (1978), available at 
http://xfx.jpkc.gdcc.edu.cn/show.aspx?id=289&cid=27 (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).   
16
  MA JUN, CHINA’S WATER CRISIS 28 (Nancy Yang Liu & Lawrence R. Sullivan trans., EastBridge 
2004).  
17
 Qiu & Li, supra note 10, at 10153.   
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 Since the establishment of this framework, the National People’s 
Congress has passed environmental legislation at a rate paralleling economic 
growth and international integration.  From 1979 to 1984, China introduced 
only six new environmental laws.  However, after 1984, China promulgated 
thirty-two environmental laws, including laws directed at the prevention of 
pollution by solid waste, the prevention and control of atmospheric 
pollution; soil and water conservation, energy production, and mineral  
mining.18  These laws addressed domestic environmental issues and 
responded to international treaty obligations.19 
 Thirty years after constitutional recognition of the obligation of the 
State to protect natural resources, epic water pollution remains, resulting 
from widespread institutional failure.  The State Environmental Protection 
Agency graded water on a scale from I to V, I being pure and safe to drink, 
IV usable only for industry and farming, and V unusable for any purpose and 
unsafe to touch.  In 2005, the agency took 411 monitoring sections for 
surface water in seven major water systems throughout the country, 
including the Yangtze River and the Yellow River.  The section ratios in 
levels I through III, levels IV through V, and inferior level V were forty-one 
percent, thirty-two percent, and twenty-seven percent, respectively.20  In 
2007, eleven of the twenty-eight major lakes were grade V.21  The China 
Watch Institute reported in 2006 that seventy percent of the nation’s rivers 
were moderately contaminated.22  While these statistics are shocking, they 
were likely underreported.  A 2009 Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(“MEP”) report suggested that previous pollution figures have been severely 
conservative, in that they did not account for agricultural waste in 
determining chemical oxygen demand.  The volume of discharge of water 
pollutants is about double previous estimates.23   
                                           
18
  Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of Enforcement, and 
Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 267, 298 (2007). 
19
  Id.  
20
  State Environmental Protection Administration, 2005 China Environment Status Gazette: Fresh 
Water Environment, http://www.zhb.gov.cn/plan/zkgb/05hjgb/200607/t20060727 91443.htm.   
21
  Jingyun Li & Jingjing Liu, China Environment Forum, Quest for Clean Water: China’s Newly 
Amended Water Pollution Control Law 4-5, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/water_pollution_law_jan09.pdf.   
22
  Zijun Li, China’s Rivers: Frontlines for Chemical Wastes, CHINA WATCH INST., Feb. 23, 2006, 
available at http://www.worldwatch.org/node/3884 (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).   
23
  Jonathan Ansfield & Keith Bradsher, China Report Shows More Pollution in Waterways, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/02/10/world/asia/10pollute.html.  
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B. Local Protectionism and Limited Resources Continue to Hamper 
Environmental Enforcement 
 Under the legislative branch, ministries, administrations, and agencies 
oversee the implementation of law.  They act as a regulatory branch at every 
level alongside CCP officials, who are responsible for general governance 
and allocation of funds.  
 In 1979, to implement the Environmental Protection Law, the 
National People’s Congress created the State Environmental Protection 
Agency, which it upgraded to the State Environmental Protection 
Administration (“SEPA”) in 1998.24  In 2008, the National People’s 
Congress acknowledged the growing necessity for effective environmental 
regulation by again, enhancing the power of the environmental agency in the 
national government.25  The Standing Committee of the 10th National 
People’s Congress elevated SEPA to ministry-level status, as the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (“MEP”).26  This increased stature allows the 
MEP to regulate formerly higher-ranking development ministries, provides 
long-term stability to the ministry, and allocates a vote in State Council 
proceedings.27  Despite the promotion, the creation of the MEP does not 
address weaknesses in vertical hierarchy and local implementation of 
national law and policy, as structural conflicts between economic 
development and environmental protection persist.28  
 The MEP is charged with the enforcement of environmental law, with 
significant overlap with related departments.29  Under the MEP, provincial, 
municipal, and county-level EPBs actually monitor conditions and 
implement fines.30  There is vertical hierarchy within the EPBs, but under 
the 1989 Environmental Protection Law, the EPBs are also accountable to 
the people’s government at the same level.31  Because each level of EPB has 
jurisdiction over emitters within its area, for any problem there are at least 
four sources of authority for enforcement (the three levels of EPBs, and at 
least the county-level people’s government).  This has resulted in ambiguity 
and conflicting goals of enforcement, further complicated by the fact that 
while environmental enforcement is under the purview of the MEP, the 
                                           
24
  Qiu & Li, supra note 10, at 10153. 
25
  Id. at 10152.  
26
  Id. at 10153.  
27
  Id.  
28
  Id. at 10160.  
29
  Qiu & Li, supra note 10, at 10158. 
30
  Id. at 10160.  
31
  Id. at 10158.  
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Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine oversees 
national environmental standards, and the Ministry of Water Resources 
defines the environmental function of each body of water.32   
 Enforcement of environmental laws is limited and sporadic due to the 
conflicting governmental goals of development and conservation, struggles 
with corruption and localization, and severely limited resources.  Local 
government officials strive to increase development as a foremost goal, both 
to meet evaluation criteria and to provide funds for the localized tax 
system.33  
 Even in instances where the political will exists for enforcement, 
resources are limited.  For example, in 1998 in Shanghai, China’s most 
populous and one of its wealthiest, most modern, and most international 
cities, pollution inspectors working full time could not manage to visit each 
factory within the city even once a year.  When officials reported violations 
and assessed fees, they collected only twelve percent of those fees.  The 
municipal EPB, with only three attorneys, lacked the resources to criminally 
prosecute violations or sue for fees.  In contrast, New York State, which has 
roughly the equivalent population of Shanghai, has ninety-eight state 
attorneys dedicated to environmental protection in addition to thirty-seven 
environmental attorneys in the attorney general’s office.34  Wang Canfa, the 
director of China’s only environmental legal aid non-governmental 
organization, Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV), 
estimated in 2005 that only ten percent of China’s environmental law is 
enforced.35 
 Enforcement has even been difficult against the government itself. 
Powerful state-owned entities that are large enough to absorb fee costs rather 
than reforming behavior further undermine enforcement efforts.36  These 
entities, prior to the ascension of the MEP, have freely ignored 
environmental standards under the protection of superior political rank.37 
Even when acknowledging environmental fines, many of these entities 
flagrantly violate laws based on a strictly economic calculus, finding it is 
cheaper to occasionally pay fees than to implement new technology.38  This 
                                           
32
  Id. at 10159.  
33
  Id. at 10160.  
34
  ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK 36, 111-13 (Cornell Univ. Press 2004).   
35
  Embassy of China, China Improves Enforcement of Environmental Laws, http://www.chinese-
embassy.org.uk/eng/zt/Features/t214565.htm.   
36
  Wang Minyuan, China’s Pollutant Discharge Permit System Evolves—Behind Its Economic 
Expansion, 19 VILL. ENVTL. L. J. 95, 100-01 (2008). 
37
  Qiu & Li, supra note 10, at 10155.   
38
  See generally Wang, supra note 36.  
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behavior is responsible for severe pollution and encourages massive-scale 
violation by both private and government actors.39  For instance, in 2005, the 
then-SEPA issued a list of thirty major national construction projects that 
violated the 2003 Environmental Impact Assessment Law and enjoined their 
continuation.40  The Three Gorges Dam Project Company, as well as twenty-
eight other companies, completely ignored the injunctions and completed the 
projects.41 
 Despite severe limitations, there is a general trend toward stronger 
rule of law and more comprehensive regulation and enforcement, spurred on 
by increasing activism, regulatory inertia, and international pressure.  Since 
starting in 1998, CLAPV has registered over 10,000 complaints and pursued 
over 100 cases, some with as many as 1,700 plaintiffs.42 During the same 
period, state agencies have gradually increased compliance.  Prior to the 
2008 amendments to the LPCWP, China created a localized water pollutant 
discharge permitting system under an earlier version of the LCPCWP and 
strengthened by the 2004 Administrative Permit Law.43  Between 1996 and 
2000, Chinese cities roughly doubled the number of permitted polluters and 
discharges, with some resulting increase in water quality.44  Furthermore, 
international bodies and foreign investors are increasingly demanding 
improved environmental regulation.  China's entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) carries explicit obligations to develop a certain degree 
of transparency and provide legal remedies, at least in the commercial 
context.45  However, rule of law is increasingly limited, and the above 
examples are exceptions to the paramount power of political control.  
C. The CCP and Its Cadre System Provide a Political Enforcement 
Structure 
 China is a civil law state guided by a Constitution.  Legislative power 
is implemented through the National People’s Congress, which was created 
                                           
39
  Id.  
40
  Qiu & Li, supra note 10, at 10155.  
41
  Id.  
42
 Austin Ramzy, Heroes of the Environment, TIME MAG., Oct. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1663317_1663320_1669921,00.html (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2011).  
43
  Winalski, supra note 13, at 188-90.  
44
  In 1996, Chinese cities that implemented the water pollutant discharge permit system issued 
41,720 pollutant discharge permits to 42,412 enterprises; in 2000, 71,027 enterprises obtained 80,899 water 
pollutant discharge permits, and the number of enterprises that obtained pollutant discharge permits had 
risen to over 80,000 by the end of 2002.  Wang, supra note 36, at 102. 
45
  Goldman, supra note 1, at 253.   
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by the Constitution.46  Despite the Constitution, the fundamental law that 
informs all of China’s institutions is the leadership of the CCP with 
multiparty cooperation.47  While the CCP is not a per se constitutional 
authority, it is the de facto supreme power and enforces one-party rule.48   
The CCP serves as a parallel power structure that ensures implementation 
and enforcement of law,49 according to its own Constitution and 
regulations.50  The LPCWP is unusual in that it statutorily invokes CCP 
implementation, which is generally assumed as an underlying premise of 
legislation.51  Article 5 stipulates that “the fulfillment of water environmental 
protection targets constitutes to be a part of the performance evaluation of 
local people’s governments or their responsible persons.”52  The cadre 
system is a formal evaluation system used by superiors within the Party to 
measure officials’ performance.  The CCP uses it to incentivize a variety of 
goals, resulting in complex ‘report cards’ for officials, with points allotted 
according to the import of a policy in a certain area.53  Prior to the LPCWP, 
the CCP invoked the cadre system to incentivize reforesting of fallow 
fields,54 but otherwise has not applied it to environmental legislation.  
 The priorities within the evaluation serve as a political structure that 
can both enhance and conflict with legislation by determining the conduct of 
state agents.  Evaluations attach strict liability for positive or negative results 
to a political official, serving as an efficient hierarchical means of 
concretizing state policies and controlling the actions of the roughly sixty 
million state employees.55  In some instances, officials are grouped and 
considered collectively responsible for the performance of any individual, in 
both professional and private life.56  Officials who meet established goals are 
rewarded with promotions, bonuses, and public praise.  This system not only 
                                           
46
  Id.  
47
 Jiang Shigong, Written and Unwritten Constituutions: A New Approach to the Study of 
Constitutional Government in China, 36 MODERN CHINA 12, 23 (2010).  
48
  IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 6 (Jianfu Chen, Yuwen Li, Jan 
Michiel Otto eds., Kluwer Law Int’l. 2002).  
49
 Jiang, supra note 47, at 27 (quoting Deng Xiaping, “without the Party laws and regulations, it 
would be hard to ensure that state laws are enforced”).   
50
  See Full Text of Communist Party of China, Seventeenth National Party Congress of the 
Communist Party of China, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/25/content_6944738.htm.    
51
  Jiang, supra note 47, at 23-27.  
52
  Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, art. 5 (2008).  
53
  Susan H. Whiting, The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party Rule, 
in HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER 101, 102-03 (Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2004).  
54
  Id. at 105.  
55
  Id. at 67.  
56
  Id. at 72 (citing example of instance in which an entire bureau lost annual bonuses because one 
member was detained on solicitation of prostitution charges).   
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furthers Party control over local agents, but strengthens the commitment 
those agents have to the Party.57  Within China’s authoritarian, communist 
structure, the cadre system provides market signals in that it incentives 
behavior with monetary reward.58 
 Failure to meet goals leads to demotions, salary reductions, and public 
censure.  Superiors attempt to meet their own performance standards by 
establishing joint strict liability for those lower officials, even extending to 
personal responsibility contracts with civilian, elected village leaders.59  The 
widespread use of the cadre system and evaluation criteria has increased 
state capacity to monitor and control lower-level agents.60  Variable and 
sometimes conflicting criteria for a variety of policy goals lead to a 
pressurized environment in which officials can be reduced to a reactionary 
role.61  
 
1.  China Has a Long History of Vertical Government Control Through 
 Responsibility and Incentive Systems  
 
 Evaluation and responsibility systems have existed in China since 
organized government.62  The imperial system channeled a tremendous 
amount of information to the emperor and relatively few magistrates.  In 
order to simplify the determinations of those who caused failures and for 
what reason, responsibility systems attached strict and joint (collective) 
liability.63  For example, the Ming Code applied collective criminal liability 
to colleagues of magistrates who committed even inadvertent errors. 
 Control of state agents is a critical aspect of any government, one that 
democratic states attempt to control from the bottom-up with elections.  For 
a brief period during the late years of Mao Zedong’s rule, the Party 
abandoned a hierarchical cadre system and attempted to control the 
bureaucracy from the bottom-up by fostering mass political campaigns and a 
state of constant revolution.64  The resulting violence and instability gave 
rise to the rebirth of a Leninist hierarchical order and cadre system as part of 
the major reforms of the 1970s.65  
                                           
57
  Whiting, supra note 53, at 102.  
58
  Qiu & Li, supra note 10, at 10162.  
59
  Minzner, supra note 9, at 56.  
60
  Maria Edin, State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a 
Township Perspective, 173 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 35, 50 (2003).  
61
  Minzner, supra note 9, at 56, 68-70.  
62
  Id. at 63.  
63
  Id.  
64
  Edin, supra note 60, at 45. 
65
  Id. at 50; see also Minzner, supra note 9, at 66.  
MARCH 2011 INCENTIVES FOR CHANGE 409 
  
 The official promulgation of the modern cadre system occurred in 
1979, when the Organization Department of the Party called for the 
establishment of a new evaluation system for officials.  The evaluations were 
to consider political thought, organizational and leadership abilities, 
familiarity with substantive issues, democratic work style, and actual 
achievements.66  Actual achievements have become the primary focus, with 
the most weight placed on numerical target goals capable of measurement.67  
   
2.  The Establishment and Implementation of Evaluation Formulas 
Reflects Regional Priorities 
  
 While the CCP sets the national policy for evaluation systems, city 
and county level officials have considerable discretion in determining the 
specific criteria and formula to reflect local conditions.68  Numerical goals 
are typically weighted in tiers according to priority.  The most important 
goals gain “veto power,” in that the failure to achieve them trumps all other 
accomplishments.69  These goals most typically are economic growth and 
birth quota goals.70  In one county in Zhejiang in 1998, embezzlement of 
over RMB 200,000, eruptions in violence resulting in a person’s death, and 
the protests of over fifty people served as veto failures.71  
 The cadre system is flexible.  Superior authorities set numerical goals, 
leaving methods of attainment to lower officials.72  Because the evaluation 
system and weighting within it is not law, those superior authorities may 
change it quickly to reflect new priorities.  The cadre system’s strict and 
joint liability is particularly well suited for countries in which resources for 
oversight of local government are limited, because it removes the need for 
superior authorities to question why a failure occurred or whose 
responsibility it was.  However, this simplicity carries with it dangers of 
falsification of results and human rights abuses. 
The cadre system has become a primary means of monitoring and 
controlling officials.  It pervades every aspect of Chinese government, 
                                           
66
 Edin, supra note 60, at 102-03.  
67
 Minzner, supra note 9, at 79.  
68
 Whiting, supra note 53, at 106.  
69
 Minzner, supra note 9, at 100.  
70
 Id.  
71
 Edin, supra note 60, at 40.  
72
 In this way, the cadre system embraces an application of most cost-efficient solutions long 
advocated by market theorists.   
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including judicial resolution of civil disputes.73  The next section will outline 
and assess the cadre system’s application.   
III. THE LPCWP’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CADRE SYSTEM HAS THE 
POTENTIAL TO FORCE LOCAL OFFICIALS TO BECOME STAKEHOLDERS IN 
WATER QUALITY ATTAINMENT 
The ultimate test of an environmental regime’s effectiveness is 
physical outcome,74 which for the purposes of this comment, is improvement 
of water quality.  The cadre system has the potential to improve water 
quality because it will enlist the political and financial support of local 
officials, which in turn will allow EPBs to more fully perform their job.  The 
political solution would allow the physical solution to occur.  
The cadre system will convert local officials into stakeholders in 
water quality attainment because it neatly fits China’s authoritarian 
government structure and Confucian and Legalist legal traditions, as defined 
and explained in Part B of this section.  The cadre system also implements a 
vertical hierarchy proven effective in the One Child Policy and increases 
mediation in the judicial system. 
A. Because the CCP Has Extensively Used the Cadre System to Remedy 
Administrative Deficiencies, It Provides a Known and Workable 
Model 
The cadre system uses an existing vertical hierarchy to connect central 
and local governments.75  This is especially important considering the 
confusion and lack of hierarchy in the Chinese legislative process.76  At the 
national level, the National People’s Congress, the National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee, the State Council, and the Supreme Court all 
have legislative powers.  State-level Local People’s Congresses also have 
legislative power of functionally equal hierarchy, and there is widespread 
confusion in the judiciary regarding resolution of conflicts of law.77  In 
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contrast, the CCP has a streamlined vertical hierarchy from county-level 
officials to the General Secretary,78 largely avoiding conflicting policies.79  
 The cadre system is an attractive means of meeting the challenge of 
regulating the environment with minimal resources because it shrinks the 
complexity of regulation.  Rather than implementing central oversight of the 
regulation of millions of pollution sources, the provisions apply a relatively 
simple output standard to water bodies and leave the attainment of those 
standards to local officials.  Streamlining of oversight is especially important 
given the enormity and complexity of China’s environmental challenges.  
 China’s leaders must manage a nation with severely depleted and 
compromised natural resources, while serving a population five times as 
large as the United States.  They must strive to pull roughly one hundred 
thirty million people out of poverty,80 while restructuring an economy that 
imports much of the developed world’s pollution.  They must do so with a 
relatively young legal system, developing rule of law, and a limited 
regulatory state.  The challenges of monitoring and enforcing a command 
and control system of environmental regulation are enormous in every 
setting.  This can be seen in an example in the United States.  In 1997, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency spent over seven billion U.S. 
dollars,81 yet in 1998 estimated that rates of significant noncompliance for 
major facilities were 20% under the Clean Air Act, 21-28% under the 
Resource and Recovery Conservation Act, and at least 7% under the Clean 
Water Act.82  These low levels of compliance, achieved at enormous cost in a 
system with strong rule of law, demonstrate the difficulty of environmental 
enforcement.   
 The paramount importance of interpersonal relationships and 
reputation within the CCP furthers central control because high-level 
officials can grant obedient lower-level officials power through the social 
prestige of high-level connections.83  Central leaders, using the cadre system 
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  Constitution of the CCP art. 10(1) (2007), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-
10/25/content_6944738.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).  
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and other means, single out and identify promising local leaders to fast-track 
their careers.  For example, central officials invite favored young party 
members to attend the Central Party School, a three-month to yearlong 
vacation, training opportunity, and networking event.84  In a system based on 
personal connections, social pressure serves to accomplish political 
objectives.  Because party membership is perceived as a requisite for 
financial success, the CCP is bigger, younger, and more educated than ever 
before.85  These future leaders, because of hierarchical control, are 
incentivized to comply with party directives, with this incentive serves as the 
critical vertical link in a centralized authoritarian state. 
 The measured successes of the One Child Policy and increases in 
judicial mediation, explained within, demonstrate that this regulatory 
mechanism is blunt, best suited for easily measureable problems, and easiest 
to implement when attempting to regulate a vulnerable population.  Because 
water quality and its causal connection with pollution sources and cleanup 
efforts is inherently complex, attenuated over time and space,86 and requires 
the regulation of politically and economically powerful actors, the 
provisions are likely to be most effective in curtailing high-profile, 
significant pollution.  Unlike the One Child Policy and judicial mediation, 
water quality attainment requires the utilization of regulatory agencies. 
1.  The One Child Policy and Encouragement of Mediation as a Judicial 
Mechanism Serve as Examples of the Brutal Effectiveness of the 
Cadre System   
 The One Child Policy has become a symbol in the West of draconian 
policies and limitations of personal freedom.  The Chinese government has 
repressed the fundamental desire to reproduce through a policy which 
severely affects women, particularly poor women in rural areas.87  However, 
in achieving the desired result, the policy has worked, as scientists agree that 
it has prevented approximately 250 million births.88   
 In the face of a population crisis and determined to markedly improve 
GDP, Deng Xiaoping implemented the One Child Policy in 1980 with a 
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revised Marriage Law.  The law delayed the age of legal marriage, provided 
free contraception to married couples, and limited births to one child per 
couple.  It codified a policy of limiting population growth and made it 
compulsory.  
 As with environmental regulations, decentralized regulation left to 
local officials with limited national oversight was ineffective and 
inconsistent.  When politically decentralized policy implementation failed to 
produce the desired results, the Communist Party Central Committee and the 
State Council decided to employ the cadre system.  The 1991 “Decision on 
Stepping Up Family Planning Work and Strictly Controlling Population 
Growth” entrusted senior party officials at each level with responsibility for 
supervising birth control in regions under their administration.  According to 
the new “family-planning target management responsibility contracts” 
announced in this Decision, the performance of party leaders and 
government officials is assessed on the basis of their “achievement” of the 
allocated birth quotas for their areas.  Failure to keep the number of births 
within the quota could mean demotion, stiff fines, or the loss of bonuses.89  
In most areas, birth quotas were given top priority in the cadre system 
evaluations, with veto power.   
 Like the LPCWP provisions, the One Child Policy incentivizes 
enforcement of a previously unenforced mandate and allows discretion in 
the method of attaining numerical goals.  In the case of the One Child 
Policy, the cadre system has been so successful that China must now contend 
with a population bottleneck.90 
 The judicial system provides another example of the rigid 
effectiveness of the cadre system in attaining at least a rough proxy for 
desired outcomes.  Judges face targets and resulting evaluation points for 
rates of mediation, case closures, and appellate reversals.91  Higher court 
officials bear responsibility for the attainment of inferior judges.92  Most 
recently, Chinese authorities have favored mediation as the preferred 
outcome and established high rate targets.  As a result, from 2004 to 2008, 
mediation rates increased 137%, with some local courts mediating 99% of 
cases.93  The attainment of these results unavoidably resulted in sacrifices of 
litigants’ rights and just outcomes. 
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2. History Suggests That the Cadre System Will Force at Least Rough 
Compliance with Policy Goals 
 The examples of the One Child Policy and encouragement of 
mediation are distinguishable from water quality attainment in that they 
impose incentives directly on government actors.  The LPCWP’s 
implementation of the cadre system, on the other hand, gambles that 
properly incentivized local officials will support the EPBs in order to gain an 
outcome.  The former examples are further distinguished in that the 
government actors carry out the policies against relatively powerless actors, 
whereas polluters are often wealthy and politically well connected.  
 The One Child Policy has been so effective in part because it 
mobilizes the power of the state against relatively powerless individuals.94  It 
has been least effective against wealthy and connected families.95  Similarly, 
the judiciary in China is weak and litigants have few enforceable procedural 
rights.  The LPCWP, in contrast, seeks to regulate industry, the wealthiest 
and most powerful player in Chinese society.  
 Because the LPCWP employs indirect incentives and regulates 
powerful actors, it is likely to be less effective than the One Child Policy and 
encouragement of judicial mediation.  However, these policies provide 
cogent examples of the power, danger, and limitations of incentivizing local 
officials to carry out national standards.  It has been a successful yet blunt 
means of quickly attacking a pressing and complicated problem.  Experience 
suggests that similar provisions in the LPCWP will serve to incentivize the 
cleanup and prevention of easily recognizable pollution.  The power of the 
enforcement policy is that it uses the power of the party rather than the court, 
but that is also a limitation.  Methods and degree of enforcement will remain 
inconsistent and unpredictable beyond achieving the result. 
 In sum, the cadre system, if implemented with sufficient weight given 
in evaluation systems, will push local officials to become stakeholders in 
environmental regulation.  That process would be enhanced and legitimized 
by allowing further public involvement.  However, the complexity of water 
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quality attainment96 exceeds that of other social policies implemented by the 
cadre system and will require the aid of EPBs, as discussed in section IV. 
B. The Cadre System Effectively Engages Chinese Cultural and Political 
History 
 While the substantive provisions of the LPCWP largely reflect 
American environmental laws, the accountability provisions mark a turn 
toward Chinese methods of enforcement.  Employing the cadre system 
should be effective because an implementation structure already exists, and 
the cadre system reflects China’s legal and cultural history.  
 Chinese environmental laws have largely adopted a command and 
control structure from western democracies with developed administrative 
states.97  That strategy has not been well-suited to China, due to its 
decentralized government structure, nascent administrative state, limited rule 
of law, and common reliance on cooperative mechanisms that use social 
pressure and connections to bargain for compliance.98  Thus, those 
environmental laws have failed not only in securing compliance from 
pollution emitters, but also in achieving widespread political investment of 
local officials.  
 Beyond structural differences, part of this failure has been due to a 
cultural misapplication.  Western schools of legal thought attempt to separate 
the individual holding the office from their official capacity.99  Furthermore, 
separation from politics legitimizes law as an objective force in Western 
society.100  In contrast, the Confucian legal tradition views the government 
official as a moral and legal example to his constituents.  While the state is 
specifically atheist, governmental philosophy reflects Confucianism through 
paternalism and belief in man’s ability to shape nature for its benefit.101  
Officials in Imperial China, popularly known as fumu guan (parent official), 
had broad political, legal, and personal power over citizens with a 
correspondingly broad obligation to oversee the general welfare in both the 
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private and public sphere.102  While the Confucian ethic dominated, 
Legalism was its constant balance, preaching limitation of officials’ 
discretion through equal application of law to official and commoner alike 
and the benefits of uniformity, consistency, and predictability.103  Unlike 
Western legal thought, however, Legalism stresses group accountability for 
individual wrongs.104  
 Application of the cadre system to a command-and-control water law 
pursues the same goals of accountability that American environmental laws 
achieve with citizen suits.  In channeling accountability to the well-
established CCP bureaucracy rather than the nascent judiciary, the law 
effectively puts a “Chinese face” on environmental law.105  The cadre system 
combines these philosophies in that it treats the official as a morally 
responsible individual agent, yet applies quantitative measures with strict 
joint liability.  
 Professor Carl Minzner argues that the system derives from functional 
rather than cultural conditions, citing as evidence the use of strict joint 
liability systems of agent control in Medieval England and elsewhere.106  
However, while the cadre system may not arise from strictly cultural norms, 
it is justified and implemented within a cultural context.  This context, of 
hierarchical liability regulating official behavior in both a moral and goal-
oriented sense, makes the cadre system well suited to Chinese governance.  
Chinese cultural history creates a hospitable environment for this means of 
enforcement and heightens its chance of success.  
 Confucianism is a form of social thought that dominated family and 
legal thought in dynastic China,107 and continues to guide Chinese culture.  
The basic tenants are those of culturally imposed duty between a lesser and a 
superior.  If every member of a society acts according to his duty in those 
relations, the society as a whole would function smoothly.108  This creates a 
political system based on custom, in which individuals are ruled by persons 
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rather than laws,109 to the extent that some scholars hesitate to even term it a 
legal system.110  
 The establishment of personal political accountability within a vertical 
governmental structure reflects Confucian values, as does granting officials 
discretion in determining how to implement a regulatory system.  However, 
tying local officials’ performance to nationally mandated standards and 
subjecting those officials to punishment diverts from Confucianism in that it 
tempers discretion and removes legally privileged status.  
 In applying objective standards to control official action, the cadre 
system reflects legalist principles.  Early legalist scholars questioned the 
attainability of a Confucian political system based on ethics, and advocated 
for law as a means to control self-interest and generate stability.111  A legalist 
system favored comprehensive national standards and gained ground with 
the collapse of the feudal system in 221 B.C. under the Ch’in and Han 
dynasties.112  Legalist underpinnings are evidenced in the punitive measures 
available in a cadre system.  By contrast, under a pure Confucian ideology, 
leaders rule by example, are not subject to punishment without imperial 
decree, and ideally would never have to punish.113  
 The provisions balance influences of both Confucianism and legalism 
in creating an enforcement provision uniquely suited to Chinese culture and 
regulatory resources.  It recognizes the duty of officials to protect their 
people and imposes an ethic upon them.  At the same time, by creating 
incentives coupled with national standards, it standardizes their political 
will, acknowledges self-interest, and guides that interest toward protecting 
water resources.  Rather than make regulation apolitical, they standardize 
and incorporate politics as a tool to achieve legal ends.  This balance of 
elements from the Chinese legal tradition represents a promising direction in 
regulatory law. 
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IV. EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CADRE SYSTEM WILL REQUIRE 
COOPERATION WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION BUREAUS 
 The cadre system will only be a successful political and physical 
solution leading to sustainable results if it incentivizes a shift in institutional 
priorities and creates real structural change in the form of empowerment of 
EPBs at all levels.  Without that step, it will serve only to address immediate 
symptoms and will leave in place the fundamental problems of insufficient 
political and financial power for effective environmental enforcement.114 
 Without structural changes, there are glaring practical and legal 
weaknesses in an upstream regulatory strategy that relies on local officials to 
bring about enforcement.  This strategy first assumes that water quality is an 
objective fact and that performance will be measurable.115  It further assumes 
accurate reporting.  In order to make those assumptions reality, Chinese 
EPBs will have to supplement national water quality standards with 
watershed-specific goals, and independently report results.  A further 
difficulty is the schizophrenic demands created by an incentive structure that 
rewards one person for both economic growth and environmental protection.  
The cadre system takes the fundamental problem that both command and 
control and market based systems face, of balancing economic growth and 
conservation, and places it squarely on local agents.  Because officials lack 
the tools to manage the complexities of water quality, in order to be 
successful, the cadre system in the LPCWP requires the expertise of the 
EPBs.   
 Fortunately, the cadre system also has the potential to facilitate EPB 
enforcement, because it removes its largest impediment:  local officials.  
Enforcement has been limited by lack of political authority and lack of 
resources, which in turn has created perverse fining incentives.  Enlistment 
of local officials as stakeholders should help to secure improved political 
and financial support.   
A. The Cadre System Will Only Improve Water Quality to the Extent That 
EPBs Can Provide Measurable Standards and Report Accurate  Data 
The examples cited in this comment, the One Child Policy and 
encouragement of judicial mediation, are easily countable and subject to 
relatively direct solutions.  Indeed, the strength of the cadre system is the 
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simplicity and accountability of applying clear, hard numbers and 
instructions.116  In the water law context, however, the cadre system will 
only create political space for EPBs to fill, and its physical success will 
depend on the EPBs’ capacity to do so. 
1. An Evaluation System Requires Accurate Data to be Physically 
Effective 
 To be anything more than a stopgap measure to address crisis episodes 
of obvious pollution, the cadre system will require consistent, accurate, 
reported data.  The cadre system works best for numerical target goals 
capable of being measured.117  The MEP possesses the technology and 
institutional capability to do so, as evidenced by its comprehensive 2009 
water quality report.  However, those reports must be more consistent to 
render useful data over time. 
2. Falsification of Reporting Represents a Major Problem that Can Only 
be Resolved by Frequent Testing and Reporting by Higher-Level EPBs 
 The cadre system works by incentivizing compliance based on self-
interest.  However, the strongest incentive for self-interested officials is to 
falsify data, allowing them to collect the benefits of attainment without 
spending resources.  In the environmental context, falsifying officials could 
achieve economic growth through polluting industries and simply provide 
fake water quality statistics.  Moreover, a vertical hierarchy system 
encourages collaboration between actors at the same level.118  
 Studies in China have found widespread falsification within the cadre 
system.  A 2008 survey of 316 villages found that eighty-one percent of the 
officials lied about their village income data, with an average of a forty-four 
percent discrepancy.119  To combat this inflation, high-level officials conduct 
elaborately secretive detection tours.  Under one method, officials were 
given three sealed envelopes to open at different stages in their journey to 
check reported birth statistics in a village, each one directing them to the 
next location on a sort of sleuthing scavenger hunt.  Village officials were 
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still able to evade this system by tracking government license plate 
numbers.120  
 Cooperative falsification can be beaten by monitorable facts.121  Water 
quality provides distinct advantages in that it is not readily moved (as 
children are under the One Child Policy) or hidden (as income data is with 
falsified forms).  It is objectively testable, but requires concrete standards 
and testing and reporting procedures.  Because of political constraints, 
previous accountability testing has required national-level enforcement 
campaigns.122  However, campaigns lack the consistency to measure 
improvement and achieve long-term behavior modification.123  Furthermore, 
they do not provide the necessary institutional changes needed for consistent 
enforcement.124 
B.  Enforcement Problems Largely Result From Political Interference 
and Lack of Funding, Obstacles That Should Be Removed if Local 
Officials Become Stakeholders 
 The provisions rest on an assumption that local officials will respond 
to incentives by forcing environmental enforcement officials to work harder, 
forcing local industry to comply with regulations and reduce polluting 
activities, and to bear environmental interests in mind when financing and 
permitting projects.  However, in the face of powerful polluting enterprises, 
constituents eager for economic development, and limited monitoring and 
enforcement resources, such demands may in some situations be impossible 
within existing structures.  Incentivized local officials could remedy this by 
providing political and financial backing. 
1. Given Weak Enforcement Tools and Cultural Preference, 
Environmental Officials in China Currently Rely on Cooperative 
Enforcement, but Political Backing Could Result in Stronger 
Regulation 
Scant enforcement is the basis for the implementation of the cadre 
system in the LPCWP.  The direct and indirect opposition by political 
officials has contributed to weak cooperative enforcement.125   
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Administrative agencies look to local governments at their own level for 
enforcement powers.126 
 For instance, a 1998 study of six Chinese EPBs found that each 
agency rarely enforced violations through the courts due to the costs, lack of 
legal training, and a desire to keep strong connections with polluting 
enterprises.127  The agencies almost never removed permits for violations or 
assessed fines for false permits, for fear that the severity of removal and 
public accusations of cheating would upset connections and social well-
being.128  They rarely assessed compound fees for lack of payment or fines 
for late payment.129 
 Proponents of cooperative enforcement assert a belief that 
partnerships and education preserve positive relationships between a 
regulator and regulated enterprise, facilitating enforcement with reduced 
transaction costs.130  Scholars claim that it reflects a cultural preference for 
solving problems through social relationships131 and a lack of resources and 
political power to enforce.  However, it cannot be effective without a source 
of power from which to bargain.  
 It is that lack of power that appears to be crucial in choice of 
enforcement mechanism.  EPB staff stated in interviews that they didn’t 
collect late fees because they feared that by penalizing enterprises, they 
might never collect any fees at all.132  Political pressures on local EPBs to 
ignore violations by wealth-producing emitters have been so strong that 
local EPB employees have resorted to writing anonymous letters to central 
EPB officials reporting violations for fear of being punished for hampering 
local development.133  Lessening these pressures would go a long way 
toward facilitating enforcement.  
 The same analysis applies to courts, which are also funded by the 
local government.134  Decisions are subject to political review at the local 
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level, and so the values of local officials are critical to judicial 
implementation of the LPCWP. 
2. Increased Local Funding Would Remove the Perverse Incentives that 
Cause EPBs to Rely on Polluting Industry for Funding 
 EPBs rely on local officials for funding.  In the past, funding has been 
limited because officials were rewarded almost entirely by economic 
growth, which the EPBs generally curtailed.  Lack of funding resulted in 
both an incapacity to properly enforce regulations and a partnership with 
polluting industries.  If incentivized local officials direct funds toward EPBs, 
these barriers may be removed.  In this way, the cadre system has the 
potential to significantly enhance enforcement.  
 Officials further blamed failures to enforce permit standards on the 
expense of monitoring, lack of quality monitoring equipment, and resulting 
weak data.135  As a result, the EPBs simply relied on data provided by the 
enterprises and pursued monitoring only if the data did not make sense on its 
face.136  This shortage has directly caused lack of enforcement, and 
indirectly aligned the interests of the regulators and polluters.  
 EPBs have grown perversely dependant on pollution, and assess fines 
and fees at a level that encourages enterprises to pollute in order to seek the 
highest profits.137  The EPBs chose low fines largely due to funding 
pressures.  In 1994, municipal EPBs were funded eighty-seven percent by 
fees, municipal environmental monitoring centers sixty-nine percent, 
municipal environmental inspection stations one hundred percent, and 
district and county EPBs ninety-five percent.138  Staff reported collecting 
fees with the goal of increasing revenue rather than ensuring compliance.139  
 Even a small amount of local funding would significantly increase the 
independence of EPBs and enhance their regulatory authority.  The cadre 
system has the potential to incentivize such funding. 
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C. Despite Potential Benefits, the Incentive Strategy of the Cadre System 
is Not Well-Suited to the Long-Term, Watershed-Scale Management 
Required to Attain Comprehensive Water Quality 
 This comment has argued that the cadre system as implemented in 
Article 5 of the LPCWP has the potential to shift institutional priorities and 
incentivize water quality improvement.  However, because the cadre system 
implements short-term goals, these improvements will likely be limited to 
pollution curable with short-term, high-yield fixes.  This will likely include 
substantial point sources due to their direct causation and individually 
significant impact, but will have limited ability to correct collective non-
point source pollution problems.  
 Water quality presents a holistic watershed-based problem requiring 
sustained regulation across multiple jurisdictions.140  Improvement has 
proven to be a nebulous and long-term endeavor in which protection projects 
often have no demonstrated link to actual cleaner conditions.141  Water 
quality, particularly in lakes and ponds with limited flushing capacity, 
involves myriad variables acting on an unpredictable timescale.  It fluctuates 
widely based on precipitation and biological cycles.  Surveys of 
environmental protection agencies in the U.S. have found that none have 
been able to provide accurate predictive measures of the effectiveness of 
compliance programs.142  Watershed managers and biologists now know that 
restoring water quality and resulting biodiversity requires the restoration of 
entire watersheds and the systems acting within them.143  The impacts of 
human activity are cumulative over space and time, and mitigating them 
requires consistent effort to restore system processes rather than discrete 
problems.144 
 The necessities of conservation conflict with the cadre system in both 
geographic scope and time.  National level leaders can solve geographic 
scope issues by evaluating regional or provincial-level officials according to 
a broad area’s water quality attainment.  Those leaders would then in turn 
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delegate responsibility to local leaders to meet certain goals.145  The problem 
remains, however, of determining the source of pollution.  Any individual 
leader not in compliance could simply blame the failure on someone 
upstream.  In this instance, the cadre system of joint liability would serve 
well by establishing collective responsibility for a collective resource.  Joint 
liability would theoretically incentivize the most cost-effective fixes, but 
would encounter significant commons problems.  
 Time is a more difficult challenge.  Because evaluation systems 
include annual review and officials are rotated on short tenures to avoid 
localism, evaluation systems are best applied to short-term, localized 
problems and solutions.146  Officials often rush to meet goals in name, rather 
than substance.  This haste to meet performance goals has resulted in 
widespread falsification (as discussed previously), as well as reactionary and 
wasteful programs. For instance, to satisfy industrial growth goals, one 
county official directed each village under him to build a paper mill, making 
the completion a priority in the village leaders’ evaluations.  Each village 
built a mill, the official was promoted and rotated, and within five years, 
each mill was out of business.147 
 As a result of the rotation system and brief tenure of officials, they are 
likely to invest financial and political resources only in quickly achievable 
goals.  Just as the United States’ Environmental Protection Agency first used 
the Clean Water Act148 to address point sources and is only now beginning to 
attack more challenging non-point sources, Chinese officials will likely 
focus their attention on major point-source emitters because they are the 
easiest to find and fix. 
V. BECAUSE THE CADRE SYSTEM IS UNDEMOCRATIC AND OPAQUE, THE 
CCP SHOULD INTEGRATE CITIZEN REPORTING TO INCREASE 
TRANSPARENCY AND KEEP OFFICIALS ACCOUNTABLE 
This comment focuses on a results-oriented analysis.  However, it is 
important to note that adoption of the cadre system operates in a context of a 
troubling, broader shift toward authoritarianism and CCP rule.149  In 
embracing a political solution that operates within a closed system, the cadre 
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system encourages officials to disregard citizens’ legal rights.  Particularly in 
the implementation of the One Child Policy, officials have committed 
atrocities in order to meet strict goals.150  The cadre system further sacrifices 
citizen involvement and legal consistency in pursuit of those results.  Doing 
so is not only undemocratic and contrary to Chinese constitutional 
principles, it is also risky because it alienates a potentially enormous class of 
overseers, and stakes governmental legitimacy on attaining water quality 
improvement.  The cadre system focuses power within the party, but in 
doing so, also focuses responsibility.  In addition, it educates citizens to 
engage in more and more disruptive protest in order to achieve change, 
which could pose a long-term threat to stability.151 
A. By Integrating Citizen Response, the CCP Could Maximize the 
Transparency and Effectiveness the Cadre System 
 The cadre system, while inherently opaque, could easily be adjusted to 
allow greater citizen involvement.  ‘The seeds of public accountability 
already exist in an increasingly rights-conscious public, a newly legislated 
requirement to divulge water quality data, a complaint procedure, and an 
evaluation system based on those complaints.  Unfortunately, that public 
voice and accountability has largely been stifled by the CCP’s unwillingness 
to cede any challenges to its authority.152  While current evaluation systems 
consider public opinion in an annual “democratic appraisal meeting,” only 
village leaders, lower officials, and leaders of key enterprises may attend 
such meetings.153  The cadre system therefore largely operates as an invisible 
hand in governance.  
 Public outcry over water pollution already exists in China.  Citizens 
have instead voiced their complaints through the Environmental Protection 
Bureaus’ complaint divisions.  From 1991 to 1993, EPBs reported that 
citizens registered 55,000 complaint letters and 80,000 in-person complaints, 
with ninety percent of those complaints relating to water or noise 
pollution.154  In 2006, the government controlled English-language 
newspaper China Daily reported that more than 50,000 disputes and protests 
arose in 2005 over pollution, and complaints to the national environmental 
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administration rose by thirty percent.155  While the Administrative 
Litigation Law and the Environmental Protection Law include citizen-suit 
provisions, such suits are incredibly rare.156 
 Many of the 55,000 complaint letters were submitted anonymously, 
evidence of continued fear of party reprisal.157  However, a burgeoning 
environmental movement and the development of an increasingly large and 
attentive corps of “netizens” promises to heighten and broaden public outcry. 
The “spotlight pressure” of public attention is a proven means of pushing 
officials to environmental compliance.158  Widespread criticism has 
successfully regulated spending in key policy areas, showing that the cadre 
system presently is at least minimally responsive to citizen complaint and 
protest.159  However, such criticism is risky for citizens and generally only 
occurs as a desperate measure. 
B. The CCP Should Exercise the Existing Statutory Authority and 
Petition System to Integrate Citizen Response 
Article 19 of the LPCWP mandates that the national government 
publish national water quality standards and also the names of provinces that 
fail to meet the standards.  It remains to be seen in the implementing 
regulations whether provincial leaders will focus the same publicity on city 
and county governments.  This localized transparency would help to focus 
responsibility and identify areas needing increased agency resources, as well 
as providing better data and accountability to combat falsification.   
 The traditional avenue for citizen complaint in China is via petition to 
relevant authorities, under the xinfang system. 160  The xinfang system works 
in conjunction with the cadre system to direct accountability measures 
toward political, rather than judicial solutions.161  This approach allows great 
access, especially for the poor, but due to limited regulations and broad 
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institutional discretion, rarely limits governmental power in a significant 
way.162  Under some evaluation formulas xinfang petitions of a certain size 
that reach higher-level officials result in score deductions.163 Savvy 
protesters can threaten protest to leverage an official’s desire to meet social 
harmony goals.164  While this use of the cadre system can successfully 
motivate officials, structural problems remain that severely limit their ability 
to enforce environmental law.  Like the cadre system, the xinfang system 
works to enhance the vertical movement of information within the 
government.165  
 Publicity accompanied with political accountability could serve to 
create the Chinese equivalent of citizen-suit enforced environmental laws, 
within a political system.  While China lacks an independent judiciary and 
tradition of legal challenge to the government, the party mechanism provides 
a powerful means of forcing regulatory action.  In past incidents of 
significant water pollution, high-level officials have satisfied public outcry 
by firing officials.166  These firings have resulted in higher water quality. 
Accountability structures and regular public disclosure of water quality 
standards could serve to codify and make consistent that practice, leading to 
political accountability to public opinion.  The cadre system would be more 
powerful and more stable if the CCP took public accountability seriously 
and institutionalized procedures for consistently hearing and accounting for 
complaints.  Such an approach is more realistic in an authoritarian system 
than robust citizen suit, but it could attain some of the same benefits.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
 China’s application of the cadre system to environmental law is a 
pragmatic use of political resources that could jumpstart regulation and 
improve the severe instances of pollution.  However, it will only be 
successful if the political incentives lead to a shift in institutional priorities 
that results in enhanced enforcement capacity.  Recruiting local officials as 
stakeholders in attaining water quality has a potential to facilitate that shift 
by creating a culture of environmental regulation and provide EPBs with 
political and financial backing.  
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 This comment recognizes that the cadre system inflicts serious 
procedural and substantive abuses of citizens’ legal rights.  Those concerns 
are real—it is imperative to develop an approach toward environmental 
protection that takes account of Chinese circumstances without 
accommodating them so completely as to surrender all possibilities of 
fostering improvement.167 
 While much attention has been paid to the Chinese import of Western 
environmental regulation strategies, an incentive based system with personal 
accountability provides a compelling model for export.  Local agency 
problems are endemic to every environmental enforcement regime, because 
national standards must be generic while local application is case-specific.168  
An evaluation system with concrete targets and public involvement 
represents a compelling compromise between the efficiency of a market-
based incentive system and the standardization of the command-and-control 
system.   
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